In 2013, Nam et al. proposed a simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (in short, S-3PAKE ++ ) protocol that can withstand dictionary attacks. However, this paper points out that the S-3PAKE ++ protocol is still vulnerable to undetectable on-line dictionary attack. For this reason, Nam et al.'s protocol is insecure for practical application.
Introduction
Recently, three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols are extensively adopted in network communication environments to provide secure communications. Since users usually choose easy-to-remember passwords, 3PAKE protocols can be vulnerable to dictionary attacks [1, 2] .
In 2007, Lu and Cao [3] first proposed a simple 3PAKE (in short, S-3PAKE) protocol. In 2009, Nam et al. [4] pointed out that S-3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to an off-line dictionary attack and then proposed some countermeasures (in short, S-3PAKE + ). In 2013, Nam et al. [5] , however, pointed out that S-3PAKE + protocol is also vulnerable to off-line dictionary attacks and then proposed another countermeasures (in short, S-3PAKE ++ ) to eliminate the security vulnerability of the S-3PAKE
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enhanced S-3PAKE ++ is still vulnerable to undetectable on-line dictionary attack in which an attacker exhaustively enumerates all possible passwords in an on-line manner to determine the correct one. For this reason, Nam et al.'s S-3PAKE
++ is insecure for practical application. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We subsequently review
Nam et al.'s S-3PAKE
++ protocol in Section 2. The undetectable on-line dictionary attack on S-3PAKE ++ protocol is presented in Section 3. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 4.
Review of S-3PAKE

++
Protocol
This section reviews the Nam et al.'s S-3PAKE
++ protocol [5] . Throughout the paper, notations are employed in Table 1 . The S-3PAKE
++ protocol works as follows:
A chooses a random number x ∈ Z q , computes
and sends < A, X * > to B.
2. B → S: < A, X * , B, Y * > B selects a random number y ∈ Z q , computes
and sends < A, X * , B, Y * > to S.
Next, S selects a random number z ∈ Z q and computes X = X z and
and sends < X * , Y * > to B.
and sends < Y * , α > to A.
A → B: β
After having received < Y * , α >, A computes
and verifies that α is equal to G(A||B||K). If the verification fails, then A aborts the protocol. Otherwise, A computes the session key SK = H(A||B||K) and sends β = G(B||A||K) to B.
B verifies the correctness of β by checking that β is equal to G(B||A||K).
If it holds, then B computes the session key SK = H(A||B||K). Otherwise, B aborts the protocol.
3 Undetectable On-line Dictionary Attack on S-3PAKE
++
Protocol
This section shows that Nam et al.'s S-3PAKE ++ protocol [5] is not secure to undetectable on-line dictionary attack by any other user. Undetectable online dictionary attack [1, 2] means that an attacker tries to verify a password guess in an online transaction. However, a failed guess cannot be detected and logged by the server, as the server cannot distinguish between an honest request and an attacker's request. First, we define the security term needed for security problem analysis of the S-3PAKE
++ protocol as follows:
Definition 1 A weak secret (password pw i ) is a value of low entropy Weak(k), which can be guessed in polynomial time.
A malicious user B with helping a legal user A can perform the following undetectable on-line dictionary attack.
A → B: < A, X
* > A operates as specified in the protocol in the first step.
2. B → S: < A, X * , B, Y * > Let B be a malicious user mediating between S and A. Upon intercepting < A, X * > form the user A in flow (1) of the S-3PAKE ++ protocol. B guesses a password pw A , and establishes an authenticated and private channel with S. B first computes
k B,1 = F (A, B, S, pw B ) (27) S then will recover X and Y by computing
Next, S will select a random number z ∈ Z q and compute X = X z and Y = g x z . S then then compute
and send < X * , Y * > to B. 
If the check passes, then B confirms that the guessed password pw A is the correct one.
5. Otherwise, B repeatedly performs the steps (2)-(4) without being noticed by S.
It is clear that if pw
Therefore, we can conclude g x = g x .
Conclusions
This paper reviewed Nam et al.'s S-3PAKE ++ protocol and then pointed out that S-3PAKE
++ protocol is still vulnerable to undetectable on-line dictionary attacks by any other user. For this reason, the S-3PAKE
++ protocol is insecure for practical application. Further works will be focused on improving the S-3PAKE ++ protocol which can be able to provide greater security and to be more efficient than the existing 3PAKE protocols by an accurate performance analysis.
